




When candidates for democratic office run for
election they are looking for funds to finance their
campaigns.These funds allow them to get the word
out about their positions, and their campaign
advertisements inform voters about those posi-
tions.1 Thus campaign advertisements can have the
beneficial effect of helping voters to make more
informed choices. However, candidates may
promise policy favors to contributors in exchange
for contributions. Some scholars argue that such
quid-pro-quos give wealthy individuals and organi-
zations an unfair advantage in the political process.
Policies may be systematically tiled to donors at
the expense of those who do not contribute to can-
didates’ campaigns. Moreover, it has been suggest-
ed that voters will become disgusted with the polit-
ical process when they believe that politicians are
for sale, and thus may cease to participate in elec-
tions and lose trust in government.
Many democracies regulate from where candidates
or parties can obtain campaign funds, the amounts
of funds, and whether the source of funds has to be
disclosed. Table 1 presents data from the CESifo
Database for Institutional Comparisons in Europe,
describing the institutional framework in which the
campaign finance regulation occurs, the laws limit-
ing contributions, and disclosure requirements.
While Austria appears to have the fewest limits on
the source and amounts of funds, and has very lit-
tle disclosure requirements, the USA has the most
regulated campaign finance system of all countries
and the strictest disclosure requirements.2
The sources of political parties financing and
financing rules for individual candidates are
described in Table 2.This table,as Table 1,provides
a snapshot of the rules, but cannot be complete as
rules are very complex, and often rules differ,
depending on whether a candidate runs for
President, for the House or the Senate, and
whether the candidate runs for local office. Some
form of public financing occurs in all countries,
although the “Public Funding” column in Table 2
reports no public funding in 1999 and 2000 for the
United Kingdom and the United States.
Cross-country work on the effects of campaign
finance regulations is virtually non-existent. Work
that wanted to examine the consequences of
reform, would ask how the regulations affect eco-
nomic outcomes such as expenditure and tax poli-
cies; electoral outcomes, such as the closeness of
election, the incumbency advantage, and the num-
ber of candidates running for office;voter behavior,
such as their voting participation and trust into the
political process; how regulations affects the trust-
worthiness of the campaign message, and whether
regulations influence legislators’ decisions.
Recent empirical work has addressed some of
these questions for the United States. For data
work, the Untied States is a wonderful laboratory
to examine these questions, as there is a large vari-
ation in campaign finance laws across the fifty
states and over time. For example, while some
states disallow corporate contributions to candi-
dates, other states allow unlimited contributions.
Similar variation exists for contributions from indi-
viduals, unions, and Political Action Committees.
Moreover,several states have made their campaign
finance laws stricter in recent years, allowing the
researcher to examining the effect of campaign
finance law changes.
Recent evidence from the 50 states suggests that
stricter limits lead to closer election margins
(Stratmann und Aparicio-Castillo 2003).Their esti-
mates imply that the introduction of contribution
limits increases the closeness of an election by up
to 7.7 percent. However, since incumbents tend to
win with large margins of victory, these numbers
indicate that the enactment or tightening of cam-
paign finance laws does not lead to a large increase
in incumbent turnover.This evidence seems to sug-
gest that limits primarily curtail the fundraising
ability of incumbents and put challengers in a
slight competitive advantage. Also stricter limits
lead to more candidates in elections (Stratmann
und Aparicio-Castillo 2003). Here, the results sug-
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1 There is some debate as to whether advertisements are truthful,
but if they are not,the opposition candidate has the opportunity to
inform voters about the “lies” disseminated for the opponent.
2 Table 1 indicates that there are no limits on independent expen-
ditures in the United States.However,in the US,there are limits on
giving to candidates from individual and so-called Political Action
Committees. Corporations and unions are not allowed to con-
tribute directly to candidates.CESifo DICE Report 1/2003 25
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gest that the introduction of individual contribu-
tion limits for individuals leads to an increase in
the number of candidates by up to five percent.
The issue as to whether campaign contributions
are actually corrupting politicians has been subject
of a lively academic debate. Contributors have
Table 1
Financing Rules for Political Parties and their Campaigns
Restrictions on fundraising and expenditure Disclosure  rules
Austria No limits on individual or corporate donations.
No limits on expenditure.
Political donations by interest groups are sub-
ject to an income tax surcharge to be paid by
the recipient party.
Donations in excess of n 7,730 must be dis-
closed (total amounts and type of donor i.e.
individual, interest group, corporation).
States do not require strict reporting and data
provided by parties on the federal level thought
to be incomprehensive for it covers only part of
the parties‘ activities and financial dimensions.
France No foreign donations.
No donations from private or public-sector
companies (since 1995).
Individual donations may not exceed c.
n 7,575 per year  and donations of more than
c. n 150 must be given by cheque, thereby
disclosing the identity of the donor.
Legal status of parties is vague; data protected
and not released to the public due to the consti-
tutional freedom of action granted to parties.
Available reports are incomplete: local activities
expenses are not detailed and links between
parties and foundations remain unclear.
Po o r  level   of   sup ervisio n  b y  regul ati ng  a ut ho rities.
Germany No limits on individual or corporate donations.
Ban on tax benefits for corporate donors im-
posed by the Supreme Court.
Donations in excess of c. n 10,300 must be dis-
closed (names, addresses, and amounts).
Ban of foreign donations except from EU citi-
zens and EU corporations.
No donations in excess of n 500 from anony-
mous individuals.
Reports and lists of donors are published in
parliament material: Bundestagsdrucksache.
Reports have a common format and are well
detailed.
The total revenue of assessments (political graft)
remains unclear.
For detailed info and statistics see:
http://www.bundestag.de/datbk/finanz/index.ht   
ml 
http://www2.spd.de/partei/finanzen/ausw_reche    
nschaftsbe       richt99.pdf   
Japan No political donations by private firms which
receive public subsidies, by corporations in
public ownership, by indebted enterprises, by
foreign individuals and organizations, or by
anonymous sources (est. 1976).
Donations limited to n 181,820 (JPY  20  mill)
by individuals and to n 68,180  – 909,100 (JPY
7.5 – 100 mill) by corporations/unions.
Donations in excess of n 440 (JPY  50,000)
must be disclosed (names of all donors: indi-
viduals, corporations, and organizations).
Names must also be disclosed of individuals or
corporations buying tickets for fundraising
events in excess of n 1,770 (JPY 200,000) per
event.
At the national level, financial reports are pub-
lished by the Ministry of Public Management,
Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunication;
on the local level, reports are published by the
local election agencies.
Unreliable data; local and national level agen-
cies do not have the authority to verify or investi-
gate the financial statements and transactions of
parties.
Restrictions have not been effectively monitored




No limits on "independent" expenditure (ex-
penditures not coordinated with a candidate).
No donations to federal elections from foreign
nationals, national banks, and other federally
chartered corporations, labor organizations and
federal government contractors.
See tables: "Federal Contribution Limits 2000”
and "Expenditure Limits for Publicly Funded
Presidential Candidates" (Foundations for
Democracy, pp. 47-48).
Relevant statistics stem from national election
years since finance is dominated by campaign
fundraising and spending (little routine spending
by parties in inter-election years).
Note: This table is a condensed version of two large tables in the DICE Database:       www.cesifo.de/DICE;    
search for "Financing of Political Parties".
Main Sources: Foundations for Democracy, Karl-Heinz, Nassmacher, ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft: Ba-
den-Baden, 2001.
Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, International IDEA Handbook on Funding Parties and Election
Campaigns forthcoming 2003.probably the largest effect on legislator behavior,
when it comes to legislation where politicians do
not have already a public position,such as on abor-
tion or the death penalty. Academic work that
looks at legislation that is not at the center of the
public eye, and legislation whose consequences are
difficult to understand for the average voter, finds
that contributions cause legislators to vote accord-
ing to the preferences of their campaign contribu-
tors, even after controlling for the interests of leg-
islators’ voting constituencies (see, for example,
Stratmann 2002).
Some recent theoretical work suggests that voters
are more responsive to the campaign message
when they believe that candidates do not promise
many favors to contributors in exchange for cam-
paign funds (Coate 2003). According to this theo-
retical work, voters are more likely to believe that
candidates promise policy favors when contribu-
tions are unlimited as opposed to limited.
Statistical evidence is supporting this hypothesis.
Stratmann (2003), for example, finds for the USA,
that when states limit contributions, an additional
$10,000 in campaign advertisement significantly
increases the candidates’ vote shares run in states
that limit campaign contribution, while a similar
campaign advertisement is not very effective in
increasing candidates’ vote shares when no laws
limit individual contributions to candidates. This
evidence is consistent with the model that votes
respond better to “clean” money, as opposed to
“tainted” money.
While new data bases have to be developed in
order to test these hypotheses across countries and
over time, Tables 1 and 2 (presented here in an
abridged version) allow for a limited analysis.
Based on the full content of the tables3, I con-
structed an index from 0 to 3 indicating the strict-
ness of campaign finance laws, where a higher
number indicates restrictions on giving to parties
and to candidates. Table 3, column 2 shows the
index I assigned to each country.
One of the major motivators for limiting contribu-
tions is the hope that limits will reduce actual cor-
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 in % of
GDP
 Austria 1998 43.6 21.0 17.3 8.0 147.4 71.0 208.3 100 204.8 0.102
 France 1998 60.0a) 40.0a) 15.0a) 10.0a) 75.0 50.0a) 150.0a) 100 1,404.8 0.011
 Germany 1999 241.0a) 61.5 33.0a) 8.5 1,230.0a) 30.0a) 392.3 100 2,025.5 0.019
 Italy 1999 n.a. n.a. 1,660
a) n.a. 50.0
a) n.a. 1,710.0
a) 100 1,165.7 0.147
 Netherlands 1999 5.15
a) 31.3 few few 4.35
a) 26.5 16.4
a) 100 401.1 0.004
 Spain 1998 n.a. <=10 n.a. n.a. 56.3 up to 90 96.5a) 100 608.8 0.016
 Sweden 1999 62.0
a) 44.0 few few 70.5
a) 50.0
a) 141.0
a) 100 246.6 0.057
 Unite
 Kingdom 1997 97.0 95.0 5.23 5.0 none none 102.2 100 1,547.9 0.007
 Australia 1998 13.0
a) 39.0
a) few few 20.0 61.0
a) 33.5 100 445.8 0.008
 Canada 2000 37.1 69.7 16.0 30.2 0.03 0.1 53.1 100 774.7 0.007





741.0 60.0 495.1 40.0 none none 1,236.1 100 10,708.9 0.012
 Notes:  Some data are unavailable. Some amounts given in national currencies have been converted into Euro. 
Data are not always comparable. The figures given relate only to the costs of the political parties, not to
those of the whole political system.
 a) Data are estimated due to lacking transparency.
 Sources: Foundations for Democracy, Karl-Heinz, Nassmacher, ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft: Baden-Baden,
2001;
Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, Chapter from the International IDEA Handbook on Funding Parties and Elec-
tion Campaigns, forthcoming 2003;
3 The full tables cover 14 OECD countries and contain more vari-
ables. See DICE database, www.cesifo.de/DICE.CESifo DICE Report 1/2003 27
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ruption and the perception of corruption in the
political process. If candidates make promises to
contributors in election year t and implement
those promises in years t+1 or  t+2, one would
expect a correlation between the index in year t
and a measure of corruption in year t+1 or t+2.The
DICE survey and thus the constructed index is for
the years 1998 to 2000. To examine the relation
between the stringency of campaign finance laws
and amount of corruption in a country, I collected
a corruption index from the years 2001 and 2002. I
collected three types of corruption indices, as
shown in the last three columns of table 4 (for
sources, see the notes to Table 4). Higher values
indicate less corruption.
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between
the index and the corruption measures. All coeffi-
cients are negative, indicating that states with
stricter contribution limits have lower corruption
indexes values. Since a lower corruption index
value indicates more corruption, the result
means that stricter campaign finance limits
are correlated with more corruption.This is
a somewhat surprising result, as typically
limits are implemented in order to reduce
corruption.4
However, this correlation does not allow
one to make a statement such as that con-
tribution limits cause more corruption. An
unobservable variable such as a country
specific “corrupt culture” may lead to the
adoption of contribution limits and the
presence of corruptness. Thus, the correla-
tion result may be due to the fact that coun-
tries that have an inherently more corrupt
culture will introduce contribution limits in
order to address the problem of already
high levels of corruption. Clearly, this line
of research requires more work.
I also examined whether the index was cor-
related with central government expendi-
tures and with whether the country has a
proportional representation or a plurality
rule electoral system but found no statistically sig-
nificant correlations. Future work may want to
examine these relations using cross-country regres-
sion analysis, which allows one to control for vari-
ables that are omitted in these simple correlations.
Future work may also want to examine a larger
sample of countries and to take account of changes
of campaign finance laws within countries,allowing
the researcher to analyze the effect of changes in
campaign finance regulations.
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Japan 3 5.3 7.1 1.202561
Italy 2 4.1 5.2 0.633461
Spain 1 5.8 7.1 1.445595
Portugal 3 na 6.3 1.212141
France 2 5.5 6.3 1.145166
United States 3 5.3 7.7 1.449898
Austria 0 8.2 7.8 1.561577
Australia 1 8.5 8.6 1.751209
Germany 1 6.3 7.3 1.37717
United Kingdom 2 6.9 8.7 1.86457
Netherlands 1 7.8 9 2.092631
Canada 2 8.1 9 2.048426
Switzerland 0 8.4 8.5 1.911583
Sweden 0 8.4 9.3 2.213424
Note: Index: author’s calculation on the basis of tables 1 to 3.
tibribe 2002: TI Bribe Payers Index (0 to 10=zero bribes).
ticorrupt 2002:  TI Corruption Perception Index
(0 to 10=clean).
wbcorrupt 2001: World Bank Corruption Control Index
(-2.5 to 2.5=less corruption).
Table 4








4 It may be worthwhile noting that the corruption indices are fairly
stable over time,thus these results do not depend much on the fact
that I chose corruption indices for 2001 and 2002 instead of, for
example 1999.